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An Administrative Learning Curve
Casualty Rehabilitation in the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force
R I C H A R D  H O L T
Abstract: This article discusses the development of an efficient
administrative system in England to handle Canadian casualties 
evacuated from units in France and Belgium. The system consisted not 
only of medical treatment but also the management of casualties with a 
view to returning as many as possible to the front lines. Specific topics 
discussed include standing medical boards, command depots responsible 
for physical training, and the disposal of those not fit for further 
service in France. The article concludes that the creation of territorial 
regimental depots in 1917 to manage casualties marked the transition of 
the Canadian Expeditionary Force from a hastily organised body to a 
well organised professional army.
In recent y e a r s , there has been some debate over whether British and Canadian forces learned from their experiences and if there 
was an identifiable “learning curve.” To date, the discussion has been 
confined exclusively to operations on the battlefield. However, there 
were also changes in the administrative sphere that were equally as 
important and paralleled the transition of the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force (cef) from the militia of 1914 to the hard-hitting, professional 
army of 1917-1918.
One of these administrative changes was the development of a 
comprehensive system to return casualties1 evacuated from France and
1 The term includes both sick and wounded.
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Belgium to the reinforcement stream after recovery. Creating such a 
system was important; in wartime, manpower is a vital commodity and 
has to be carefully husbanded. Units in France depended on a steady 
stream of reinforcements to maintain an effective fighting strength. Not 
all of these reinforcements were fit men from Canada; a substantial 
number were casualties who had been restored to full health.
Surprisingly, historians have paid little attention to the creation of 
a comprehensive system for returning casualties to the reinforcement 
stream. Colonel Nicholson’s magisterial official history does not 
mention the topic, even in passing. However, as he wrote, the scope of 
the book was such that much could be covered “only in broad outline, 
for the limitations imposed by the covers of a single book have ruled 
out the inclusion of much detail.”2 The official medical history, on the 
other hand, contains a brief discussion of command depots but not 
the overall system.3 Medical historians have overlooked the means by 
which casualties were managed, perhaps because their interest lies in 
medical and not administrative care.4
Returning casualties to the front was not a straightforward matter 
since many of those discharged from hospital were not immediately 
fit for active service and required a period of convalescence to rebuild 
their strength. If these men were retained in hospital, they became 
‘bed-blockers’. But if they were returned to a reserve unit5, they 
became an unwelcome burden on staff who were fully occupied 
training recruits. The problem, then, was what to do with these men 
until they were fit for active service.
Initially, men discharged from hospitals who required ‘hardening’ 
before being recycled into the reinforcement stream were simply posted
2 Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1918 (Ottawa: 
Queen’s Printer, 1964), xii.
3 Sir Andrew Macphail, The Medical Services, (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1925), 204-208.
4 Recent examples include Mark Harrison, The Medical War: British Military 
Medicine in the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Bill 
Rawling, Death Their Enemy Canadian Medical Practitioners and War (Quebec: 
AGMV Marquis, 2001); and Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, Seventy Years of Service: A 
History of the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps (Ottawa: Borealis Press, 1977). 
Mark Humphries’s recent article “Willfully and With Intent: Self-Inflicted Wounds 
and the Negotiation of Power in the Trenches,” Histoire sociale/Social History 
XLVII, no. 94 (June, 2014) deals with administrative aspects but is limited to cases 
of self-inflicted wounds in France.
5 Reserve units, based in England were intended to train fit soldiers who could then 
be posted to France as reinforcements.
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Table 1: Reserve Battalions Unfit Men 
April-December 19156
Tem porarily Permanently Proportion
Month Fit Unfit Unfit Convalescents Total Unfit Unfit (Percent)
April 3929 673 78 340 1091 21.7
May 2842 643 123 3056 3822 57.4
June 4565 831 252 3097 4180 47.8
July 8093 843 278 3607 4728 36.9
August 8010 1008 376 3763 5147 39.1
September 8858 1226 496 3718 5440 38
October 10029 1730 541 3946 6217 38.3
November 15159 2062 552 3610 6224 29.1
December 15823 2953 953 3562 7468 32.1
Notes: (1) The Infantry Base Depot and the Automobile Machine Gun Brigade have been excluded 
from the April return. (2) Battalions earmarked for the 3rd Division have been excluded from the 
October and November returns.
to reserve units that had to be reorganised to accommodate these 
convalescents. In July 1915, for example, the 9th Reserve Battalion 
with the Canadian Training Division (ctd) held physically fit trainees 
in A, B, C and D companies while E and F contained those who were 
unfit.6 7 Not all of the unfit had been previously wounded; there were 
those who were permanently unfit for military service for whatever 
reason but had to be kept in England because there were was no 
formal administrative mechanism for disposing of them.8
Not surprisingly, as shown in Table 1, the number of unfit men 
held by the reserve battalions increased steadily over time. These 
unfit men must have been a significant administrative burden to 
reserve battalion staffs whose primary duty was training infantrymen 
and not caring for invalids. Private Cox of the 2nd Battalion, for 
example, was shot in the left elbow at Ypres in April 1915, evacuated
6 TNA WO 114/26, Weekly Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents 
at Home other than the Territorial Force 26 April 1915; TNA WO 114/57, Weekly 
Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents at Home other than the 
Territorial Force 31 May 1915, 28 June 1915, 26 July 1915 and 30 August 1915; 
TNA WO 114/27, Weekly Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents 
at Home other than the Territorial Force 27 September 1915, 25 October 1915, 29 
November 1915 and 27 December 1915.
7 LAC RG 9 III D3 Vol 4950 File 476 reel T-10761, Medical Officer’s War Diary 
28 July 1915.
8 TNA WO 293/2, War Office Instruction 148 of 18 May 1915 directing that 
members of the CEF who were permanently unfit for military service regardless of 
the cause would be posted to the Canadian Training Division.
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to England 2 May 1915, and hospitalised in Sheffield. Discharged 
from hospital in June 1915, Cox was then posted to the 12th 
Reserve Battalion where he remained until he was pronounced fit 
in February 1916 and drafted to France. Presumably the reserve 
battalion provided remedial exercises during this time.9 In another 
case, Private Blake of the 4th Battalion was evacuated (as a prisoner) 
to England on 28 August 1915 suffering from a mental disease. On 
arrival he was admitted to the 4th London General Hospital and 
posted to the 12th Reserve Battalion. On 30 November 1915 he was 
discharged to Canada ‘under escort’. There is no evidence he was 
discharged from hospital and it is probable that he never reported to 
the 12th Battalion. Nonetheless the unit was still responsible for his 
administration.10 Lastly, Corporal Ferguson of the 15th Battalion was 
repatriated to England in August 1915 after his leg was amputated in 
a German prisoner of war camp. Posted to the 17th Reserve Battalion 
on 11 September, he was discharged from Shorncliffe Military Hospital 
23 September. Unlike Blake, Ferguson reported to the 17th and 
remained with the unit until he was returned to Canada 22 October 
1915. In this case the reserve battalion was responsible not only for 
administration but for rations, quarters, and medical care.11
From a unit perspective, the problem with unfit men was acute 
since they were not evenly distributed amongst the reserve battalions. 
In May 1915, the 32nd Reserve Battalion held 336 convalescents 
and seventy-eight trainees while the 23rd Reserve Battalion had 
trainees only. A few months later, in September 1915, the 9th Reserve 
Battalion had 866 invalids and 998 trainees, the 39th Reserve 
Battalion had 832 unfit and 1,134 fit while the 48th had fit trainees 
only. On average the eleven reserve units had 495 unfit men each. 
A  few months later, in December 1915, the majority of the unfit 
were concentrated in nine battalions, leaving eight with only a few
9 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 2085, personnel file 8086 Lewis Cox.
10 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 801, personnel file 26512 George Blake. On 
arrival in Canada Blake was diagnosed with ‘delusional insanity’ and committed to 
the provincial asylum at St. Jean de Dieu at Longue Pointe, Quebec. He died at the 
Westminster Veterans Hospital in London on 30 October 1967 after more than fifty 
years in psychiatric institutions.
11 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 3040, personnel file 28022 Angus Ferguson.
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men who were temporarily unfit.12 The degree to which instructors 
were diverted from their primary duties depended on the number of 
invalids and in some reserve battalions the emphasis must have been 
on handling the unfit. Clearly some form of holding unit was required 
to allow the reserve battalions to get on with their primary job.
As noted previously there was no formal administrative 
mechanism to dispose of permanently unfit men or to accommodate 
the wounded who required graduated exercises before re-entering 
the reinforcement stream. The results were inevitable and as shown 
in Table 1, almost a third of the invalids in reserve battalions in 
December 1915 were unfit for military service. From a functional 
point of view, these men presented two problems. First, more than a 
third of the bed spaces at the principal cef training base at Shorncliffe 
were taken up by invalids, leaving less than 14,000 spaces for fit 
infantry trainees.13 Second, the hard-pressed training staff with the 
reserve battalions had to devote time and energy to administering 
the invalids, time that should have been spent on their primary job 
of training reinforcements.
The British army had the same problem and in April 1915 
created large convalescent hospitals as a solution. However, this 
approach proved to be unsatisfactory since there was a general 
shortage of hospital beds and many of the invalids did not require 
hospitalisation but a regimen of graduated exercises to become fit for 
the front. In October 1915, therefore, depots were formed in each of 
the commands in Great Britain. Known as command depots these 
were not hospitals but convalescent centres where recovering invalids 
received “graduated exercises, including massage and therapeutic 
gymnastics, the ultimate object being to harden invalids sufficiently 
to enable them to join their reserve battalions within six months in a 
condition fit for drafting overseas.”14 However, command depots were
12 TNA WO 114/57, Weekly Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents 
at Home other than the Territorial Force 31 May 1915; TNA WO 114/27, Weekly 
Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents at Home other than the 
Territorial Force 27 September 1915, 25 October 1915 and 27 December 1915.
13 LAC RG 24 Vol 1841 File GAQ 10-39D, Minutes of a Conference held at the 
War Office 28 April 1916 with representatives of the CTD, Director of Quartering, 
Director of Organization and Director of Staff Duties noting that there were enough 
huts for 21,000 men at Shorncliffe.
14 Major-General Sir W.G. MacPherson, History of the Great War: Medical Services 
based on official documents General History: Vol I  (London: H.M.S.O., 1921), 91.
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intended only for British troops; dominion forces had to make their 
own arrangements.15
In December 1915, Canadian Director of Recruiting and 
Organization Colonel F.A. Reid examined the problem of unfit men 
with reserve units. His solution, modeled on the British command 
depot, was to establish a Canadian casualty depot to care for men 
discharged from hospital who required hardening. As Reid noted, this 
casualty depot would allow the reserve battalions to focus on training 
which “would bring them up to a far higher state of efficiency.”16 His 
proposal was reviewed by ctd Headquarters at Shorncliffe and the 
Director of Medical Services at Canadian Headquarters in London, 
both of whom thought additional features should be added. As a 
result, the proposal, which was approved by Canadian Headquarters 
in January 1916, went far beyond Reid’s idea to establish a command 
depot and instead created a comprehensive system to handle all those 
who were medically unfit.
Under the new system, casualties evacuated from France and 
Flanders to hospitals in England were posted to a new unit, the 
Canadian Casualty Assembly Centre (ccac). These postings were 
based on casualty lists produced by General Headquarters 3rd 
Echelon, the agency responsible for all personnel movements in 
France, which meant the ccac nominal roll was only as accurate as 
the information provided by the 3rd Echelon. Members of the cef 
who had been discharged from hospitals in Britain were sent to ccac 
Headquarters at Folkestone where they were assessed by a Standing 
Medical Board. Those who were fully recovered were posted to a 
reserve battalion and fed back into the reinforcement stream while 
those who were unlikely to become fit within six months were posted 
to another newly-created unit, the Canadian Discharge Depot, for 
repatriation to Canada or release in the British Isles.17 Men who had 
recovered but were fit for sedentary duties only were retained by 
the ccac in garrison duty battalions to provide workers for routine 
fatigues and relieve fit men for the front; those who showed an 
aptitude for clerical work were trained by the School of Stenography
15 LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 48 File 8-5-58, War Office circular letter 2 November 1915.
16 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, Director of Recruiting and Organization 
to Officer i/c Records, Westminster 9 December 1915.
17 Lieutenant Ralph E. Mathews, Souvenir of the Canadian Discharge Depot; 
Published as a Memento of the Last Rest Camp in England (privately printed, nd), 
Copy held by the Imperial War Museum
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Canadians at Buxton proceeding to the station for discharge and Furlough. [Library and 
Archives Canada PA 005133]
in London as replacements for fit clerks who could then be posted to 
France.18 Finally, those who had not fully recovered but would likely 
be fit within six months were posted to another unit, the Canadian 
Command Depot (ccd) at Monks Horton, for remedial exercises and 
‘hardening’ before rejoining the reinforcement stream.19
The system was periodically modified as problems arose. In June 
1916 Headquarters ctd ruled that men admitted to hospital from 
units in England would be posted to the ccac if the hospital staff 
determined they were unfit for full duty. Those who were insane or 
suffering from epilepsy or tuberculosis would also be transferred to 
the ccac for repatriation to Canada, presumably because of the need 
for specialised medical care not available at the Canadian Discharge 
Depot.20 Lastly it was decided in November 1916 that men with
18 LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 74 File 10-8-22 Vol 1, AG Headquarters Canadians to Sir 
George Perley 7 November 1916; The Imperial War Museum holds a printed copy 
of a booklet System of Handling and Disposition of Casualties in the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force (London: np, 31 October 1916). Presumably the author was 
Colonel F.A. Reid, the Canadian Director of Recruiting and Organization
19 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, Chart showing progressive steps in 
disposal of a casualty dated 11 January 1916.
20 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, Headquarters CTD circular letter 1 
June 1916.
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newly-arrived battalions who were found to be permanently unfit by 
medical boards would be transferred to the ccac for discharge or 
posted to a garrison duty battalion to perform routine fatigues.21
The role of the ccd was to rehabilitate casualties and return them 
to reserve battalions where they would be fed into the reinforcement 
stream. However, Reid thought the reserve battalions would bungle 
the job and in July 1916 wrote to the Officer in Commmand (oic) 
of Reinforcements at Canadian Headquarters in London that “very 
much better results would be secured in so far as Monks Horton 
[CCD] is concerned, if the men from there were drafted direct from 
Monks Horton to their Units in the Field. A  large number of these 
men, after they are in shape physically, are returned to Reserve 
Units and are lost.”22 But, as oic Reinforcements pointed out, it 
would be difficult to document, re-equip and dispatch men to the 
continent directly from the ccd and as a compromise a new unit, 
the 1st Canadian Casualty Training Battalion was created to return 
men to their units.23 Intended to be a reserve battalion responsible for 
reinforcing three fighting battalions at the front, the new unit opened 
at Brighton on 23 October 1916.24 A simplified diagram of the new 
arrangements is shown in Figure i .
The most successful part of this elaborate system was the ccd , 
designed to hold up to 4,000 men at a time in order to bring them 
“to the necessary fit condition in a very short time to return to 
duty overseas [in France or Belgium].25 From the beginning, this 
unit returned a steady stream of rehabilitated casualties to reserve 
battalions until the end of war. The success was such that a second 
command depot followed in August 1916 and a third in January 1917. 
The three depots were then harmonised with the reserve structure
21 LAC RG III B1 Vol 490 File R-50-1, Headquarters Canadians Brighton to GOC 
Canadian Troops Seaford, OC Canadian Troops Crowborough and OC Canadian 
Troops Seaford 20 November 1916.
22 LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 48 File 8-5-58, Director of Recruiting and Organization to 
OIC Reinforcements 21 July 1916.
23 LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 48 File 8-5-58, OIC Reinforcements to Director of Recruiting 
and Organization 22 July 1916; System of Handling and Disposition of Casualties in 
the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 87.
24 LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 420 File E-103-1, Draft entry for CTD Orders 24 October 1916.
25 LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 48 File 8-5-58, War Office to GOC Shorncliffe 17 April 
1916 approving the establishment of the Canadian Command Depot and enclosing 
War Office letter 24/General No. 4309 (AG 1) 1 October 1915 with the approved 
establishment for a command depot; LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 48 File 8-5-58, CTD i/c 
BF & PT to Director of Recruiting and Organization 19 July 1916.
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Figure 1: Simplified Outline Casualty Rehabilitation and Disposal 1 9 1 6
Casualty Battalion Reserve Battalion
France or Belgium France or Belgium France
in England. Number 1 Canadian Command Depot was affiliated 
with new regimental depots in the Shorncliffe area, Number 2 with 
regimental depots in the Bramshott area and Number 3 for all other 
regimental depots.26
The ccd training program was progressive and geared to the 
trainees’ medical condition. On arrival, men were divided into four 
groups: those who could do all exercises with no difficulty, those 
who could not do strenuous exercises, those who could not do arm 
and shoulder exercises, and those who could not do much except for 
“gentle exercises, games and slow walks.”27 Not all convalescents were 
enthusiastic about the carefully designed program to restore them 
to full health, however, and in June 1916, Colonel Reid noted that 
“these men are not all desirous of being again fitted for the Front, 
and do not at all appreciate the Physical Training.”28
Unlike the ccd, the ccac was not overly successful. Intended to be 
“a Central Authority [in England] for the controlling of casualties,”29
26 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, Headquarters Canadians Routine Order 
1307 of 22 August 1916, Headquarters OMFC AG circular letter 7 January 1917
27 System of Handling and Disposition of Casualties in the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force, 80.
28 LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 48 File 6-5-58, Director of Recruiting and Organization to 
Major-General Carson 27 June 1916.
29 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, Director of Recruiting and Organization 
(Colonel Reid) to Canadian Records Office 9 December 1915.
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A  Sergeant of the Fort Garry Horse who went through the Battle of Cambrai, packing his kit 
at Buxton, Canadian Discharge Depot. [Library and Archives Canada PA 005139]
creating and maintaining accurate and up-to-date records of the 
whereabouts and status of all those held on strength was absolutely 
essential. The ccac, however, failed to do this and thus became an 
administrative nightmare instead of an efficient means of managing 
manpower.
The ccac was an independent unit commanded throughout 
its existence by Captain E.A. Hudson (promoted to major on 18 
September 1916), a remarkably junior officer to command a unit that 
reached a peak strength in February 1917 of 41,125 men, 13,849 
of whom were in hospital.30 Each man had a personnel file and to 
simplify record-keeping, Hudson elected to divide the files into five 
groups based on the individual’s corps, an awkward arrangement that 
did not acknowledge the many exceptions to the norm and led to 
some confusion. “Difficulty is often experienced in maintaining these 
categories” commented the Canadian Records Office in November 
1916 “when a soldier belonging to the Infantry is attached to an
30 LAC RG 24 Vol 184 File GAQ 11-11C, historical summary “Canadian Casualty 
Assembly Centre,” prepared by Edwin Pye 20 April 1939.
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Artillery unit for duty and subsequently returned.”31 The same could 
be said for the Canadian Army Service Corps driver serving with a 
field ambulance who was wounded and evacuated to England.
The status of the ccac as a unit also meant that only one set of 
Part ii Daily Orders was issued.32 With more than 13,000 men posted 
to or from the ccac in October 1916 alone, Part ii Orders were very 
lengthy.33 34Not surprisingly, given the volume of personnel transactions 
and the division of records, there were numerous errors. These errors 
were compounded when reserve units provided inaccurate or incomplete 
nominal rolls or in some cases, posted men to the ccac without notifying 
Headquarters ccac.34 In some cases, reserve units failed to transfer 
unfit men to the ccac. Private Roberts of the Canadian Cavalry Depot 
suffered a compound fracture of the right leg when he was kicked by 
a horse. After being treated in the Canterbury and Central Military 
Hospitals, Roberts was transferred to the Canadian Special Hospital 
at Granville on 9 January 1916 until he was discharged on 20 July 
and posted to the ccac. From February to July 1916, Roberts was 
unknown to the ccac who could not therefore manage his case.35 No 
doubt others were in a similar position.
By October 1916, it had become apparent to Prime Minister 
Borden that the cef organisation in England was badly in need of 
reform. However, given the extent of the problem, merely modifying 
the existing structure was not enough and after careful consideration, 
Borden and his cabinet approved an order-in-council on 27 October 
1916 creating a new ministry, based in London, the Ministry of the 
Overseas Military Forces of Canada (omfc). A  few days later, on 1 
November 1916, Sir George Perley, the Canadian High Commissioner, 
was formally appointed as the new minister.36
31 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, ‘Memorandum Relating to Organizing 
the CCAC in Relation to Its Effect on Record Office’ prepared 24 November 1916 by 
Colonel Kemmis-Betty, i/c Canadian Records Office
32 Part II Orders listed all changes to the status of individual soldiers including 
promotions and postings.
33 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, ‘Memorandum Relating to Organizing 
the CCAC in Relation to Its Effect on Record Office’ prepared 24 November 1916 by 
Colonel Kemmis-Betty, i/c Canadian Records Office.
34 In other words, neither the reserve battalion nor the CCAC could be sure of 
where the man actually was.
35 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 8341, personnel file 2475 Peter Joseph Roberts.
36 Desmond Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics: Canada’s Overseas Ministry in 
the First World War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 88-89.
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One of Perley’s first jobs was to create an efficient military 
headquarters to bring order to chaos. To do this, he brought Major- 
General (later Lieutenant-General) R.E.W. Turner back from 
France and appointed him General Officer Commanding (goc) 
Canadian troops in England and de facto chief of staff of the new 
Headquarters.37 Turner then selected his principal staff officers; in 
particular the Adjutant-General, Brigadier-General P.E. Thacker, 
a Permanent Force officer who had served as Director of Military 
Training at Militia Headquarters and had been seconded to the War 
Office in 1912.
The first task of the newly-appointed staff was to review the 
state of the reinforcement structure in England. The results were 
depressing. Lieutenant-Colonel McDonald, head of the General 
Staff Branch, reported there was no system for the supervision 
or coordination of training, unit establishments were unsuitable 
both for training and supplying reinforcements, and there was a 
lack of training materiel because Canadian establishments did 
not correspond with British establishments. Thacker’s report was 
similar. Reserve units did not have formal establishments, the 
reserve organisation was ill-suited to provide reinforcements, and 
the control of manpower by the ccac was unsatisfactory.38
Thacker’s comments were well-founded. In November 1916 an 
audit by the Canadian Records Office in London showed that a large 
number of men ostensibly with the ccac were actually serving in 
France, had deserted, died, been repatriated to Canada or simply 
did not exist.39 Nor was the 1st Casualty Training Battalion any 
more effective. By 29 January 1917, there were 1,168 men with the 
battalion. However with one exception all were in category Aiii (fully 
trained but required hardening). In effect, the new unit was not a
37 Ibid., 98.
38 LAC RG 9 III A1 Vol 53 File “Monthly Reports February 1917,” Report: General 
Staff, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 20 February 1917; Report: Adjutant 
General’s Branch, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, 20 February 1917.
39 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, “Memorandum Relating to Organizing 
the CCAC in Relation to Its Effect on Record Office,” prepared 24 November 1916 by 
Colonel Kemmis-Betty, i/c Canadian Records Office, Headquarters CTD Shorncliffe 
circular letter 1 June 1916 referring to CTD Order 1636 of 1 April 1916 noting that 
units had transferred men to the CCAC without notifying Headquarters CCAC.
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reserve battalion capable of providing reinforcements but an extension 
of the ccd .40
Thacker moved quickly. Dissolving the Casualty Training Battalion 
was easy and the unit was disbanded on 19 February 1917.41 The 
command depots and discharge depot were working well and were 
therefore retained. Doing away with the ccac however was another 
matter. After careful consideration, Headquarters omfc announced in 
February 1917 that the unit would be replaced by newly-organised 
Regimental Depots commencing 10 March 1917. While casualties from 
France could be absorbed by the new depots almost immediately, 
transferring men from the ccac took some time, if for no other reason, 
as Thacker wrote that care had to be taken “not to transfer more men 
at one time than can be handled by the various [new] Regimental 
Depots without causing congestion.”42 By the end of March 1917, the 
new system was largely in place. However, it was not until August 1917 
that more than 6,000 missing men could be traced and until then, the 
ccac records section had to remain in existence.43 *
The newly organised regimental depots were part of a larger 
scheme to reorganise the cef in England and France on a rational 
basis. For the infantry, battalions with the Canadian Corps in France 
and reserve brigades in England were assigned to one of twelve 
territorial regiments. Each of the regiments also included a regimental 
depot. The remaining arms and services were not reorganised on a 
territorial basis but a regimental or corps depot was created for each.
One of the principal reasons for the administrative chaos in the 
ccac had been the sheer volume of personnel records involved and 
the number of men on strength. The new structure, as spelled out 
in February 1917 by Headquarters omfc, decentralised personnel 
administration so clerks with the new regimental and corps depots
40 TNA WO 114/31 Weekly Returns of the British Army and Dominion Contingents 
at Home other than the Territorial Force 29 January 1917; TNA WO 293/4 ACI 
1023 of 19 May 1916 defined medical categories including Ain.
41 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, Headquarters OMFC Routine Order 
762 of 10 March 1917 announced that the battalion had ceased to exist as of 19 
February 1917.
42 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, Instructions for Dealing with Casualties and 
Non-Effectives Generally of the Canadian Overseas Military Forces, 26 February 1917.
43 LAC RG 24 Vol 184 File GAQ 11-11C, historical summary ‘Canadian Casualty
Assembly Centre’ prepared by Edwin Pye 20 April 1939.
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Table 2: OMFC Reorganisation 10 March 19177
R e g im e n t D e p o t F ig h t in g  U n it s
1st Central Ontario Regiment Shorncliffe
7  infantry battalions 
2 pioneer battalions 
1 labour battalion
2 nd Central Ontario Regiment Shorncliffe 5 infantry battalions
Manitoba Regiment Shorncliffe
7  infantry battalions 
1 pioneer battalion 
1 labour battalion
British Columbia Regiment Seaford
7  infantry battalions 
1 labour battalion
Eastern Ontario Regiment Seaford 5 infantry battalions
1st Quebec Regiment Shoreham
4  infantry battalions
1 labour battalion
2 nd Quebec Regiment Shoreham 5 infantry battalions
New Brunswick Regiment Shoreham 2 infantry battalions
Western Ontario Regiment Bramshott
4  infantry battalions 
1 pioneer battalion
Alberta Regiment Bramshott 5 infantry battalions
Saskatchewan Regiment Bramshott 5 infantry battalions
Nova Scotia Regiment Bramshott 4  infantry battalions
Cavalry Shorncliffe 4  cavalry regiments
Artillery Shorncliffe
All horse, field, heavy and siege 
batteries and trench mortar batteries
Service Corps Shorncliffe All service corps units
Engineers Crowborough All engineer units
Machine Gun Corps Crowborough All machine gun units
Medical Corps Shorncliffe All medical units
Railway Troops Purfleet All railway units
Forestry Corps Sunningdale All forestry units
All other corps and miscellaneous 
details
Shorncliffe
Note: Fighting units included infantry battalions with the 5 th Division.
45 LAC RG 9 III B i Vol 1002 File R-5-3 Vol 3, OMFC Routine Order Number 608 
of 24 February 1917.
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Physical Training at 1st Command Depot, Shorncliffe. [Library and Archives Canada PA 005715]
had far fewer files to deal with which significantly reduced the 
possibilities of errors.44
M circular instruction issued 26 February by Thacker spelled out 
the administrative details of the new system. “Reserve units only 
will be responsible for the training of fit men. The only unfit men 
carried on the strength of Reserve Units will be those who are on 
the permanent establishment [for general duties].”46 Garrison duty 
battalions were disbanded and their functions assumed by regimental 
depots. Those who were not fit were posted to a corps or regimental 
depot if they were evacuated from France or, if serving in England, 
were found to be unfit for service in France. Those who became fit 
after hospital treatment or graduated exercises at a ccd were returned 
to a reserve unit and then recycled into the reinforcement stream.47
In comparison to the ccac the new system was a model of 
simplicity. While there is no direct evidence that it was any better than
44 LAC RG 9 III B1 Vol 1002 File R-5-3 Vol 3, OMFC Routine Order Number 608 
of 24 February 1917.
46 Unfit men were posted to every reserve unit to perform unit fatigues which 
otherwise would have been done by fit trainees. LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11- 
11C, Instructions for Dealing with Casualties and Non-Effectives Generally of the 
Canadian Overseas Military Forces, 26 February 1917.
47 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File GAQ 11-11C, Instructions for Dealing with Casualties and 
Non-Effectives Generally of the Canadian Overseas Military Forces, 26 February 1917.
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Figure 11: Simplified Outline Casualty Rehabilitation and Disposal 1 9 1 7
Wounded/Sick 1
England
| Unfit in England
Regimental Depot
I
 ^ Hospital j
Medical Board >
[ CCD ] C Reserve Unit
| Reserve Unit j  ^ Regimental Depot j
c Unfit
Regimental Depot Discharge Depot
------ 1 J 1 1-----
j Garrison Duties j | Discharge Depot j | Garrison Duties j | Canada 
Note: Rehabilitated casualties were posted to France from reserve units only.
France
the c c a c , the fact that regimental depots, the command depots and 
the discharge depot were retained until demobilisation was completed 
in 1919 suggests strongly that the new organisation met the need for 
accurate records and close control of personnel movements.
Specific cases illustrate the efficiency and flexibility of the 
new system. Private Bagley of the 7th Machine Gun Company, 
for example, was wounded at Passchendaele in October 1917. 
Evacuated a week later to England, he was simultaneously admitted 
to hospital and taken on strength of the Canadian Machine Gun 
Corps Regimental Depot. Transferred to a convalescent hospital 
13 January 1918, he fully recovered and was dispatched to the 3rd 
Canadian Command Depot for hardening on 5 March 1918. Six 
weeks later he was pronounced physically fit and returned to the 
Canadian Machine Gun Corps Training Depot for posting back to 
France.48 On the other hand, Private Bird of the Royal Canadian 
Regiment became ill and was evacuated to England in February 
1918. Posted to the Nova Scotia Regiment Depot, he was treated at a 
convalescent hospital and then attached to a command depot in July 
for hardening. However, his medical condition failed to improve and 
on 25 August 1918 Bird was returned to his regimental depot and
48 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 336, personnel file 624851 Archie Clifford Bagley.
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Table 3: Men Evacuated to England 1917-1919 Disposition52
D isp o sitio n F ro m  C C D
F ro m  H o sp ita l o r  
R eg im en tal D ep o t Total
P ro po rtio n
(percent)
Posted to reserve unit 212 142 354 59.6
Discharged to Canada 62 169 231 38.9
Transferred to RFC or RAF 0 4 4 0.7
Deserted 2 0 2 0.3
Died 0 2 2 0.3
Posted to Young Soldiers 
Battalion
0 1 1 0.2
Total 276 318 594
Proportion 46.5 percent 53.5 percent
Note: It is assumed that men posted to a reserve unit were available for military service of some description 
although medical complications could delay return to duty.
attached to the 2 3 rd Reserve Battalion for garrison duties before he 
was returned to Canada.49 Private Kroeker of the 8th Battalion was 
wounded in the Vimy sector at the end of April 1 9 1 7  and suffered 
the loss of his left leg. Evacuated to England 2  May 1 9 1 7 , he was 
posted to the Manitoba Regiment Depot and admitted to hospital 
where he remained until 17  October 1 9 1 7  when he was repatriated to 
Canada for further treatment. Unlike similar cases in 1 9 1 5 , Kroeker 
remained on strength of his regimental depot throughout and was 
not posted or attached to a reserve battalion.50
How successful were the ccac and the regimental depots? In 
March 1916, Colonel Reid noted that 5,501 men had been screened by 
ccac Standing Medical Boards of whom 2,363 or forty-three percent 
would “be reclaimed for overseas service” after rehabilitation at the 
Command Depot.51 52Since 60,308 men passed through the ccac up 
tc] December 1916, it is estimated that as many as 25,000 former 
casualties had been returned to duty, assuming that the majority
49 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 746, personnel file 814241 John Bird.
50 LAC RG 150 acc 1992-93/166 Box 5258, personnel file 874497 Barney Jacob Kroeker.
51 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File 11-11C, Director of Recruiting and Organization to 
GOC Shorncliffe 28 March 1916.
52 Taken from on-line personnel files found on the LAC data base “Soldiers of the First 
World War,” available at http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/archivianet/index-e.html.
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An old soldier (73 years) bidding good-bye at the station, prior to sailing for Canada. [Library 
and Archives Canada PA 005134]
successfully completed their training at the ccd— a very significant 
addition to the manpower pool.53
Reid’s estimate was based on a small sample of men admitted to 
the ccd in a three month period and may have been understated. A 
sample of 594 casualties evacuated to England from January 1917 to 
February 1919 shows that 59.6 percent were eventually returned to 
duty in some capacity. Less than half of these men passed through 
the ccd but the majority of those who did (76.8 percent) returned to 
a reserve unit and hence became available for duty. Admittedly the 
sample may be too small to be statistically definitive, but the results 
suggest the casualty rehabilitation system materially benefited the cef 
by returning a substantial number of men to duty. With 125,884 sick 
and wounded evacuated to England from January 1917 to November 
1918, it is probable that more than 70,000 men were eventually posted 
to a reserve unit and thus rejoined the reinforcement stream.54
Admittedly the figures are soft, but it seems evident that large 
number of the sick and wounded were able to serve again in France;
53 LAC RG 24 Vol 1844 File 11-11C, “Canadian Casualty Assembly Centre,” DHS 
summary written by Edwin Pye 20 April 1939.
54 LAC RG 9 III B3 Vol 3765, Strength returns CEF units in France and Belgium 
January 1917-November 1918.
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a very substantial addition to the reinforcement pool. But, this 
was possible only because the cef developed an efficient system for 
managing casualties. Creating this system took time. Initially, in 
1915, reserve units had a dual role; managing casualties and training 
reinforcements. However experience showed that these roles were 
mutually exclusive and in early 1916, casualty management was 
centralised with the creation of the c cac . But the ccac suffered from 
poor records management and the sheer size of the organisation led to 
inefficiency. Not surprisingly, when Headquarters omfc was formed 
in December 1916, steps were taken to form territorial regiments with 
regimental depots to care for those who were unfit. Decentralisation 
proved to be the key and the system created in March 1917 was 
a vast improvement over the c cac .55 During the same period, the 
cef in general and the Canadian Corps in particular moved from 
a militia-based force to a well-organised, hard-hitting professional 
army. The changes in casualty management were but one facet of this 
development and a study of these changes clearly shows the transition 
of the cef into an efficient force designed to fight a modern war.
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